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Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is an important branch of quantum communica-
tion that transmits confidential message directly in a quantum channel without utilizing encryption
and decryption. It not only prevents eavesdropping during transmission, but also eliminates the
security loophole associated with key storage and management. Recently measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QSDC protocols in which the measurement is performed by an untrusted party
using imperfect measurement devices have been constructed, and MDI-QSDC eliminates the secu-
rity loopholes originating from the imperfections in measurement devices so that enable application
of QSDC with current technology. In this paper, we complete the quantitative security analysis of
the MDI-QSDC. The security capacity is derived, and its lower bound is given. It is found that the
MDI-QSDC secrecy capacity is only slightly lower than that of QSDC utilizing perfect measure-
ment devices. Therefore QSDC is possible with current measurement devices by sacrificing a small
amount in the capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum principle provides powerful and novel tech-
nique for confidential communication [1–3] and data pro-
tection [4, 5]. As a unique manner of confidential commu-
nication, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)
transmits information directly through a quantum chan-
nel without establishing a secret key in advance, using en-
tanglement [3, 6–10], or single photons [11]. It is in strik-
ing contrast to quantum key distribution (QKD) where
only random numbers are transmitted, and information
is transmitted in a subsequent classical communication
in the form of ciphertext. QSDC has several distinct
features, that is, no key distribution, no key manage-
ment and no ciphertext, which provides additional secu-
rity protection, in addition to the security in transmis-
sion, for instance, there is no threat of key loss. It has a
wide range of applications, such as direct communication,
authentication, quantum bidding, secret sharing and dis-
tribution of pre-determined key. Of course it can also be
used to perform the key agreement just like QKD. QSDC
is also source saving, for instance, in the two-step QSDC
protocol [6], only one qubit transmission is required to
transmit one bit of information, whereas in BB84 QKD,
it requires one qubit and two classical bits where one clas-
sical bit is for comparing basis and another is for trans-
mitting ciphertext. QSDC has been developed greatly
in the last two decades, and many protocols have been
proposed and studied [12–23]. Proof-of-principle exper-
imental demonstrations have been completed in recent
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years. Single-photon-based QSDC protocol, DL04 [11],
merged with frequency coding, is demonstrated experi-
mentally in a noisy and lossy channel [24]. Demonstra-
tion of entanglement-based QSDC are completed with
atomic quantum memory [25], and optical fiber entan-
glement devices [26]. QSDC with data locking [27], with
quantum low probability of interception [28] and two-
way QSDC with single photons [29] have also been pro-
posed and demonstrated experimentally. A fully func-
tional QSDC prototype has been built that sends secure
information over 1.5km with 50bps last year [30], and
10km with 4kbps quite recently [31]. Quantum-memory-
free QSDC protocol has also been proposed [32], which
has solved one big obstacle for the practical application
of QSDC.
Security is crucial in practical QSDC. Defects in de-
vices, especially measurement devices, may lead to loop-
holes in practical QSDC systems, and give chances
to adversaries to eavesdrop secret information [33–
35]. To solve these problems, measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QSDC protocols [36–38] and the
device-independent QSDC protocol [39] have been de-
signed in the last two years. Specifically, device-
independent QSDC can achieve secure communication
even there are defects in all devices in a QSDC system.
MDI-QSDC can eliminate the security loopholes associ-
ated with the measurement devices, which are the major
security loopholes in practice. It introduces an untrusted
third party to perform all the measurements using im-
perfect measurement devices, yet Alice and Bob can still
ensure the security. Thus, MDI-QSDC is very appealing
with the current technology.
Security analysis of QSDC is very different from that of
QKD [40]. In QSDC, Eve must either gets all parts of the
entangled states simultaneously in entanglement-based
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2QSDC protocols, or the states before and after the infor-
mation encoding in single-photon-based QSDC protocols
to steal information [27]. However, Eve will be detected
in the transmission of the first part of entangled pairs, or
the single states before a message is encoded. Therefore
Eve obtains nothing about the confidential message. Se-
curity analysis of QSDC without MDI [30, 41] has been
studied recently. It is vital to study the security of MDI-
QSDC protocols and give the quantitative parameters of
the protocols. In this work, we analyze the security of
recently proposed MDI-QSDC protocols [36, 37], namely,
the protocol with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs
[36],which we call MDI-TS QSDC, and the protocol with
single photons [37], which we call MDI-DL04 QSDC here-
after. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
construct first an equivalent protocol of the original MDI-
TS protocol [36] to facilitate the analysis. The equivalent
protocol does not change the security and functionality
of the original MDI-TS QSDC, but makes it easier for
the security analysis. In section 3, we prove the security
of MDI-TS QSDC and derive the lower bound of secrecy
capacity. In section 4, security of MDI-DL04 QSDC is
proved, and the lower bound of its secrecy capacity is
also provided. Finally, we summarize in section 5.
II. AN EQUIVALENT PROTOCOL OF MDI-TS
PROTOCOL
In the MDI-TS QSDC, there are three parties, two
legitimate users, Alice and Bob, and one untrusted third
party, Charlie who performs all the measurements. The
protocol contains 6 steps:
Step 1. Alice prepares n EPR photon pairs, and takes
one photon from each pairs to form a sequence, SA. Al-
ice inserts m single photons at random positions of the
remaining photons, the partner photons of SA, to form
another sequence, CA, which contains n + m photons.
Bob does the same and prepares two sequences,SB , which
contains n photons from n entangled photon pairs, and
CB , which contains n + m photons composed of n pho-
tons from n entangled photon pairs and m single pho-
tons inserted at random positions. The entangled pho-
ton pairs are at the Bell state |ψ−〉, and the single pho-
tons are randomly at one of the four states, |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. The
Bell states have the form shown in equation (1).
|φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉) /
√
2,
|φ−〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉) /
√
2,
|ψ+〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉) /
√
2,
|ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉) /
√
2.
(1)
Step 2. Alice and Bob send CA and CB to Charlie
respectively while keeping SA and SB in their hands.
Step 3. Charlie makes Bell measurement on photons
pairwise, one from CA and one from CB , then announces
the results to Alice and Bob. According to the photons
provided by CA and CB , there will be three cases: (i),
both photons are partner photons from EPR pairs. (ii),
both photons are single photons, and (iii), one photon is
a single photon and the other is a partner photon from
an EPR pair. For these three cases, case (iii) will be
discarded for simplicity and symmetry, while case (ii)
will be used for security check, and case (i) is utilized
to transmit secret message because a photon in SA and
the corresponding photon in SB will be entangled due to
entanglement swapping.
Step 4. Security check. After receiving the results of
Bell measurement, Alice and Bob exchange position in-
formation of their m single photons and the correspond-
ing basis information. For single photons prepared in the
same basis, the decomposition in terms of Bell states is
shown in equation (2)
| 0 0 〉 = (|φ+〉+ |φ−〉) /√2,
| 1 1 〉 = (|φ+〉 − |φ−〉) /√2,
| 0 1 〉 = (|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉) /√2,
| 1 0 〉 = (|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉) /√2,
|+ +〉 = (|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉) /√2,
| − −〉 = (|φ+〉 − |ψ+〉) /√2,
|+−〉 = (|φ−〉 − |ψ−〉) /√2,
| −+〉 = (|φ−〉+ |ψ−〉) /√2.
(2)
An adversary’s attack will be identified because her
action will cause inconsistent results in the Bell mea-
surement, and Charlie’s dishonest behavior will also be
found.
Step 5. Encoding the message. After confirming the
security and removing redundant photons used in the
above steps, the particles shared by Alice and Bob are
now all in Bell states, and we name the particle sequence
at Alice and Bob as MA and MB , respectively. Alice
will use four kinds of unitary operations to encode mes-
sages, namely U00 = I, U01 = σx, U10 = iσy, U11 = σz
to represent 00, 01, 10, 11 respectively, which are exactly
the dense coding operations. Meanwhile, Bob performs
Ui,j , i, j ∈ {0, 1} randomly on photons in MB . We call
this operation as a “cover” operation, because after this
operation, states of each photon pair in MA and MB will
be completely random in four kinds of Bell states and the
details are only known to Bob.
Step 6. Alice and Bob send the encoded MA and MB
sequences to Charlie, and Charlie performs the Bell mea-
surement. Charlie then publicly announces the measure-
ment results, and Bob can decode the message by com-
bining the measurement results and initial states of MA
and MB .
We use the idea of virtual qubits [42] to construct the
equivalent protocol. In Step 1, the inserted single pho-
tons are replaced by entangled photons when preparing
CA and CB . This means, SA and CA (also SB and
3CB) have the same sequence length with all particles
in Bell states. Then for security check, Alice or Bob
performs corresponding unitary operations according to
Charlie’s measurement results to complete entanglement
swapping, which changes Bell states shared by Alice and
Bob into a uniform state, such as the singlet state, in or-
der to simplify the parameter estimation. Alice and Bob
will apply local measurements in the Z or X basis, on
photons in SA and SB in their hands respectively. Se-
curity check will be carried out by Alice and Bob who
announce the measurement results and compare them if
the results are the same or not. Quantum bit error rates
(QBERs), such as bit error rate and phase error rate,
are also obtained from these measurement results. Con-
sequently, the equivalent MDI-TS protocol contains the
following steps:
Step 1′. Alice prepares n EPR photon pairs at Bell
state |ψ−〉, and splits each entangled pair into two parts.
One part forms sequence SA and another part is CA. Bob
will do the same and prepares SB and CB .
Step 2′. Alice and Bob send CA and CB to Charlie
for Bell measurement while keeping SA and SB in their
hands respectively.
Step 3′. Charlie announces measurement results, and
Alice or Bob performs proper local unitary operations to
complete the entanglement swapping. Then Alice and
Bob make random local measurements in basis Z or X
on randomly selected photons from SA and SB . Photons
of SA and SB are entangled and the measurement results
will be correlated parallel or anti-parallel if both photons
of an EPR pair are measured under the same basis, which
is XX or ZZ.
Step 4′. After ensuring the security, Alice and Bob
discard photons whose partner photons have been used
in the preceding security check and obtain MA and MB .
Then Alice encodes the message using dense coding uni-
tary operations Uij , (i, j ∈ {0, 1}), which were defined in
Step 5, and Bob will apply an arbitrary unitary opera-
tion Ui,j as cover operation randomly on each photon in
MB .
Step 5′. Alice and Bob send the encoded MA and MB
sequences to Charlie for the Bell measurement. Bob then
decodes the message from Alice after Charlie announces
the measurement results.
This modified MDI-TS QSDC is an equivalent trans-
formation of the original one, and is convenient for secu-
rity analysis.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE
EQUIVALENT MDI-TS PROTOCOL
In MDI-QSDC, confidential message is transmitted be-
tween legal users, and the potential adversary is kept ig-
norant of the content. There are also broadcast channels
between the three participants for the necessary classi-
cal information to execute the protocol. We denote the
system of Alice, Bob and the adversary Eve as A, B
and E respectively. Then the secrecy capacity CS be-
tween two legal participants is given as (3) according to
Csisza´r−Ko¨rner theory [43],
CS = max [I(A : B)− I(A : E)] . (3)
where the exist of CS implies there is a forward encoding
scheme with lower capacity than CS , it can be used to
transmit the message reliably and securely to receivers.
This is quite different from QKD which relies on post-
processing.
In the equivalent MDI-TS protocol, we are ignorant of
the measurement process and strategy that an adversary
may exploit, hence we focus on the system after the en-
tanglement swapping, where a joint state ρjntAB , consisting
of photon pairs shared between Alice and Bob. We con-
sider a situation where Eve attacks the system with an
auxiliary system |E〉 and performs coherent attack. Ac-
cording to quantum De Finetti theorem [44], we can use a
direct product of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) subsystems ρ⊗nAB to approximate ρ
jnt
AB asymptoti-
cally, if a randomized permutation is applied to the sys-
tem, that is, Alice and Bob can permute the particles in
their hands with PµρjntABP†µ, where Pµ is the permutation
operators and the same permutation is chosen with some
classical information µ. In this case, Eve’s attacks can
be considered as collective attack, and it is a sufficient
deliberation that |ΦABE〉 is a purification of ρAB . Using
the method in [45], we can erase non-diagonal elements
of ρAB in the Bell basis with local unitary operations Uν
and construct ρAB in bases {|ψ−〉, |ψ+〉, |φ−〉, |φ+〉} as
ρAB = δ1|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ δ2|ψ+〉〈ψ+|
+δ3|φ−〉〈φ−|+ δ4|φ+〉〈φ+|,
(4)
where
4∑
i=1
δi = 1. Then |ΦABE〉 is
|ΦABE〉 =
4∑
i
√
δi|Ψi〉|Ei〉, (5)
where |Ψi〉 is the Bell states shared by Alice and Bob,
and |Ei〉 is the orthogonal states of system |E〉.
In security check of Step 3′, the bit error z and phase
error x will constrain parameters δi as z = δ3 + δ4 and
x = δ2 + δ4. Alice and Bob will then carry out the
message encoding process in Step 4′. Bob performs cover
operations, and we have
ρcABE =
1
4
(|ΦABE〉〈ΦABE |+ σBx |ΦABE〉〈ΦABE |σBx
+ σBy |ΦABE〉〈ΦABE |σBy + σBz |ΦABE〉〈ΦABE |σBz ).
(6)
After Alice’s encoding operation, it becomes
ρijABE = Uijρ
c
ABEU
†
ij , (7)
4where i, j ∈ {0, 1} which represents the four unitary op-
erations described in Step 4′.
We denote the codeword that Alice encodes as C =
{ζ1, . . . , ζm}, where ζi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and stands for a two-bits symbol, and the probability
of C is pC . Then employing Holevo bound [46], we can
calculate the mutual information I(A : E) of the joint
system AE, supposing that each symbol in {ζi} has the
same distribution pζi =
1
4 . Thus, we have
I(A : E) ≤ S
(∑
pC
pCρCABE
)
−
∑
pC
pCS
(
ρCABE
)
≤ m
S
∑
pζ
pζρ
ζ
ABE
− 2
 , (8)
where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy and ζ represents
ζi for succinctness. After some calculation, we can obtain
the subsystem mutual information of AE
I(A : E) ≤ h(z) + h(x), (9)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function. We denote the
gain of Bob for message decoding as Q and the gain gap
between the channels of AB and AE as η. The error
rates obtained from message decoding are noted as E ,
which is a vector with four components (remember ζ ∈
{00, 01, 10, 11}) representing the error rate distribution.
If the main channel between Alice and Bob is a symmetric
discrete one, and the input symbol with equal probability,
the secrecy capacity is
CS ≥ Q {2−H(E )− η [h(z) + h(x)]} , (10)
according to equation (3), where H(·) is the Shannon
entropy.
It should be noted that we have utilized permutation
operations Pµ and local unitary operations Uν to sim-
plify the analysis. These two operations both employ
the public channel to exchange classical information µ
and ν, which may cause additional information leakage.
Hence equation (10) serves as the lower bound of secrecy
capacity if we remove the two operations.
As an example, we apply the above analysis to the
depolarizing channel where the change of the channel is
ρ⇒ ρˆ = p I2+(1−p)ρ, and p is a parameter describing the
channel, and Q = η = 1. We perform numerical simula-
tion, and the simulation results are shown in Fig.1. The
channel parameter of MDI-TS protocol describes quan-
tum channel of one side, and we assume that a symmetric
channel model, which implies that the two channels, Al-
ice to Charlie and Bob to Charlie, of MDI-TS protocol
are totally the same. We can find that compared with
two-step QSDC, MDI-TS QSDC have lower secrecy ca-
pacity. The reason is apparent because there are two
quantum channels utilized in the MDI-TS QSDC, hence
more influences from the depolarizing effect of the chan-
nel.
FIG. 1. Secrecy capacity of MDI-TS QSDC over quantum
channel parameter p/2.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF MDI-DL04
PROTOCOL
DL04 protocol uses single photons for QSDC. We now
analyze the security of MDI-DL04 QSDC. Suppose Alice
is going to send secret message to Bob. Alice and Bob
prepare photon sequences SA and SB respectively. SA
consists of entangled photons and single photons as in the
original MDI-TS protocol, while SB contains only single
photons. Single photons in both SA and SB are randomly
prepared in nonorthogonal bases. Single photons in SA
will be used for security check, while entangled photon
pairs will be used for message transmission. Now we give
the equivalent MDI-DL04 protocol first. Step 1′′ to Step
3′′ in the equivalent protocol are the same as Step 1′ to
Step 3′, and
Step 4′′. After ensuring the security, Alice and Bob
discard redundant photons used in previous steps, and
end up with MA and MB . Alice encodes message with
unitary operations U0 = I and U1 = σu, which represent
classical bit 0 and 1 respectively. The operation σu is
one of the three unitary operations {σx, iσy, σz}. Alice
chooses one of them to represent classical bit 1 and keeps
using it until one round communication is completed, and
she tells Bob what operation she has chosen.
Step 5′′. Alice sends MA to Charlie for single photon
measurement on each of the photons. Bob tells Charlie
the measurement basis to be used, which depends on U1.
If Alice has chosen U1 = σx then Charlie should use ba-
sis Z, or basis X if Alice has chosen U1 = σz. Charlie
gets measurement results RMA and announces it to Bob.
While photons in MB , which is still held by Bob and were
entangled with those in MA after Charlie’s Bell measure-
ment, will collapse into single photon states. Bob will use
the same basis that Charlie used and make single pho-
ton measurement, and obtain results RMB . Combining
5with RMA , Bob can decode the message that Alice has
encoded. It should note that if U1 = iσy is used in Step
4′′, then basis Y should also be used in Step 3′′ in order
to obtain error rate y under basis Y .
Now we analyze the security of MDI-DL04 QSDC.
Comparing the equivalent protocol of original MDI-TS
QSDC (Step 1′−5′) and MDI-DL04 QSDC (Step 1′′−5′′),
differences are only in the encoding and decoding process
of the message. Bob keeps MB in hand without sending
out, hence the state of system AE is
ρkAE = UkρAEU
†
k , (11)
where k ∈ {0, 1}, ρAE = TrB (|ΦABE〉〈ΦABE |). Conse-
quently, the secrecy capacity satisfies
CTs ≥ Q [1− h(e)− ηh(u)] , (12)
where e is the error rate from the message, and u is the
error rate of the basis in U1 that used when encoding
the message. We simulated the secrecy capacity of MDI-
DL04 and the result is shown in Fig.2. When estimating
the QBERs, basis Y is used in MDI-DL04, hence u = y,
while X and Z are used in DL04. We can see that MDI-
DL04 has a lower secrecy capacity compared with DL04
without MDI. This is expected because we have more
transmissions and operations.
However, the secrecy capacity difference between MDI-
DL04 and DL04 is not as large as that in Fig.1 for en-
tanglement QSDC protocols. This is because in DL04,
both X and Z are used, resulting in the leakage in-
formation subject to I(A : E)DL04 ≤ h(x + z) [30],
indicating a lower secrecy capacity estimation of non-
MDI DL04 where the constraint between error rates is
max(y) = x + z. Relatively, in equivalent MDI-DL04
protocol, only one basis is used, therefore a lower bound
is obtained [41]. For that reason, the difference between
the secrecy capacities of MDI-DL04 and non-MDI DL04
protocols diminishes.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we have analyzed the security of two
MDI-QSDC protocols, MDI-TS and MDI-DL04, that
eliminate measurement devices related loopholes. Lower
bound of the secrecy capacity of these two protocols is de-
rived. MDI-QSDC has a slightly smaller secrecy capacity
than that of a non-MDI QSDC protocol due to its higher
security requirement. MDI-QSDC increases the security
of QSDC, enabling it with current imperfect measure-
ment devices. As two users send their photons to a third
party in the middle, the MDI-QSDC can efficiently dou-
ble the communication distance. The security analysis of
these protocols has fulfilled an essential requirement for
the practical application of QSDC.
FIG. 2. Secrecy capacity of MDI-DL04 QSDC over quantum
channel parameter p/2.
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